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Taking worker productivity to a new level? Electronic Monitoring in homecare – the 
(re)production of unpaid labour 
 
 ‘They said to us, if we went over our time with a service user we wouldn’t get paid because 
that’s not the contracted hours.  The council won’t pay them, so the agency won’t pay us.  So 
if we did an extra hour, which happened quite often if somebody had a fall or someone 
wasn’t well and you stay on because it’s your duty of care, we wouldn’t get paid for that.’ 
[Care worker, Authority A] 
 
The editors of this journal have outlined the capacity of digital technology to restructure the 
temporal dimensions of work and called for further focused empirical study (Howcroft and Taylor, 
2014). This article explores the impact of the Electronic Monitoring (EM) of homecare work on 
working time in the context of severe financial pressures on public sector provision of social care in 
the UK. Homecare workers are overwhelmingly women and provide personal care to older and 
disabled people in their own homes (referred to as ‘service-users’ or ‘clients’). The vast majority are 
employed by private sector organisations delivering care that has been commissioned on a cost 
competitive basis by local authorities (Bessa, 2013; Rubery et al., 2015).  It is proposed that EM in 
combination with Zero Hours Contracts (ZHCs) contribute to the reconfiguration of paid and unpaid 
working time because they enable the removal of what might be deemed ‘unproductive’ working 
time through ‘client contact only payments’ (where providers are paid only for the time that care 
workers are in the service-user’s home).  
The article focusses upon the narrative underpinning the development of EM and local authority 
commissioners’ requirements for EM in the commissioning and performance of local authority 
contracts. The discourse is one of improved compliance, efficiency and quality assurance. It had 
been argued that increased productivity in care work was problematic (Himmelweit, 2005). 
However, the introduction of EM offers a new level of managerial control in an occupation where it 
had not been possible because of the location of work in service-user’s homes. The requirement for 
homecare providers to use EM systems means that care visits can be measured and costed in 
quantitative terms. Time sheets are replaced by integrated computer-telephone technology to log, 
analyse, report on and invoice service user visits. In the case studies discussed below EM involved 
workers logging in and out through service-user’s telephones, but they may also do so by swiping 
tags on service-users files with smart phones or may be tracked through smart phones via GPS 
technology.  
Whilst EM is used to monitor the real-time location of workers the case studies show that it is also 
being used to delineate paid working time. For Marx, an increase in the rate of surplus value may be 
achieved through  the extensification of labour time (absolute surplus-value) or increases in 
productivity, technical improvements and/or work intensification involving change in the utilisation 
of work (relative surplus-value) (1976).  Work intensification may entail the reduction of paid labour 
time and an increase in the ratio of unpaid to paid working time (Mavroudeas and Ioannides, 2011). 
The majority of homecare workers are employed on Zero Hours Contracts (ZHCs) (Skills for Care, 
2016) where there is no legal obligation between employers and workers to provide or perform 
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work (Adams and Deakin, 2014), reflecting employer preferences for work-on-demand scheduling 
(Jacobs and Padavic, 2015). ZHCs facilitate episodic or intermittent paid working time (unpaid 
waiting time between visits) alongside the non-payment of travel time between home visits, with 
implications for the application of statutory hourly minima (Bessa et al., 2011).  
If ZHCs shift the ratio of paid to unpaid labour through contractual means, this research shows how 
EM provides the technological capacity to differentiate paid and unpaid labour.  In order to avoid the 
‘evangelical’ approach to ‘IT-enabled change’ (Bergvall-Kareborn and Howcroft, 2014: 213) and 
‘familiar flaw of technological determinism’ (Howcroft and Taylor, 2014:1) this article will place 
emphasis upon the wider political economy of public service provision and the marketization of care 
in the context of the retrenchment of the welfare state (Dominelli and Hoogvelt, 1996). In addition, 
the importance of political agency will be highlighted.  In a small number of local authorities the 
adoption of the UK public sector union, UNISON’s, Ethical Care Charter1 mediates the use of ZHCs 
and EM by commissioning on the basis of higher charge rates for homecare and thus a Living Wage 
and paid travel time for homecare workers. The research problematizes the contingency of EM’s 
relationship with the contractual status of homecare workers, exploring the inter-relationship of the 
two under different commissioning regimes. As is evident below, the minute by minute 
commissioning of care introduced by one local authority represents a qualitative and quantitative 
step-change.  
The article begins by conceptualising reorganised working time in homecare. The research is located 
in the context of the political economy of care - the swingeing cuts to adult social care and 
downward pressure on local authority commissioning. The prevalence of ZHCs in homecare is 
highlighted as providing the contractual underpinning for EM in the context of attempts by local 
authorities to reduce the costs of care. The methodological basis of the research, two case studies of 
local authority commissioning in the south west of England (with wider reference to nine case 
studies where UNISON’s Ethical Care Charter has been adopted) is then presented. The findings 
draw upon textual evidence in the form of commissioning and supplier documentation, as well as 
interviews with representatives of local authorities, suppliers and providers, to explore how a 
narrative legitimatising the introduction of EM has been produced. The argument is that the 
introduction of EM may go beyond concerns for compliance, adult safeguarding and care quality and 
be driven by cost savings realised through the excision of what is considered to be ‘unproductive’ 
paid working time whilst workers remain available to the employer. The implications of EM for the 
labour process, managerial control, contestation of the boundary between paid and unpaid labour 
and workers’ capacity for discretionary care are then examined.  
 
The Political Economy of Homecare 
Almost all (97 per cent) homecare workers in England are employed outside the public sector; either 
working for independent sector contractors or directly employed via direct payments (Skills for Care, 
                                                          
1 UNISON’s Ethical Care Charter (ECC) was launched in 2012 and called for councils to sign up to becoming 
Ethical Care Councils by commissioning homecare services which establish: ‘a minimum baseline for the safety, 
quality and dignity of care by ensuring employment conditions which a) do not routinely shortchange clients 
and b) ensure the recruitment and retention of a more stable workforce through more sustainable pay, 
conditions and training levels’. By 2016 15 Councils and care providers had adopted the Charter. 
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2013). Despite increasing demand there have been significant cuts in adult social care budgets and 
intense pressure on labour costs (ADASS, 2016). A 2015 study by Employers’ Federation, the UK 
Homecare Association (UKHCA), found that almost 90 per cent of local authorities across the UK were 
paying an hourly contractual (charge) rate less than £15.74; the minimum price at which it calculated 
employers can fully comply with minimum labour standards, including care workers’ travel time as 
paid time for the purposes of what was then the National Minimum Wage2 (NMW)).  
The ability of providers to deliver contracts based upon local authority set charge-rates depends upon 
ZHCs. They have become standard across the homecare sector with 58 per cent of homecare workers 
calculated to be on ZHCs in 2016 (Skills for Care, 2016). By creating periods of unpaid labour within 
working time homecare workers pay may breach statutory requirements once hourly rates are 
averaged out over the time they are effectively available to the employer. This may include periods of 
‘waiting time’ or ‘down time’ between visits, training, supervision or travel time. The UKHCA has 
estimated that travel time comprises an average of 19 per cent of available hours and is generally 
unpaid (2012)3. The UKHCA’s 2015 survey (2015) suggested that no London borough was paying an 
hourly rate sufficient to support the London Living Wage4 (advocated in the Ethical Care Charter): 
Where councils pay an unrealistic price while expecting a Living Wage they run the risk that 
their providers cease to be economically viable, or that areas such as training and care 
coordination are sacrificed to increase wages to the required rate. In reality the aspirations of 
such councils are little more than empty promises to local workers. 
Unpaid working time has become embedded in the organisation of homecare. ZHCs facilitate the 
elimination of ‘unproductive’ time, with the boundaries between paid and unpaid working time 
blurred since care workers are required to be available to their employers without guarantees of paid 
work. However, the increased requirement by local authorities for EM can locate the worker within 
the service users’ home as the basis of paid work introducing a clear demarcation between paid and 
unpaid labour. 
Theorising Electronic Monitoring and the temporal dimensions of work 
Whilst an increased heterogeneity, fragmentation and intermittency of working time has been 
associated with a departure from a Taylorist model (Supiot, 2001), there is evidence that ‘the legacy 
of Taylorism has endured’ (Ellis and Taylor, 2006: 110). Dominelli and Hoogvelt (1996) identified how 
re-organisation of local authority functions and duties insisted on a purchaser-provider split and 
‘contract government’ that required ‘inputs and outputs be operationalized, measured, costed and 
evaluated’ (1996: 52).  They concluded that the fragmentation of the care labour process mimicked 
Taylorism.  Work intensification in homecare is enshrined in the ‘care package’, a term that suggests 
                                                          
2 Now the National Living Wage, introduced by the UK Government in April 2016. 
3 Whilst UNISON has mounted a successful legal challenge to the non-payment of travel time (Whittlestone v 
BJP Home Support Limited UKEAT/0128/13/BA, 2013) which was recognised as ‘time work’, evidence from the 
case studies presented here suggest that local authority charge rates cannot always accommodate such costs. 
4 The Living Wage is an independently-calculated wage rate based on what employees and their families need 
to live on, the rate is higher for London and both the Living Wage and London Living Wage are above the 
Government’s National Living Wage.  
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a commodity rather than a relationship, and homecare is increasingly a task-based service governed 
by the clock.  
Marxist theory of Relative Surplus Value (1976) is useful in explaining the intensification of working 
time and conceptualising the shifting relationship between paid and unpaid labour which both ZHCs 
and EM deliver. It describes how increased productivity may be achieved through technology and/or 
the condensation of labour through ‘a closer filling up of the pores of the working day’ (Marx, 1976: 
534); in Green’s words ‘those gaps between tasks during which the body or mind rests’ (2001, 56) 
and which for homecare workers over the past decades have been paid.  Parallels can be drawn with 
a study of mobile hairdressers who also undertake mobility for work and where time between visits 
has been characterised as ‘dead’ or ‘baggy’ time or ‘unproductive spatio-temporal in-betweens’ 
(Cohen 2010). The extent of time-space dependence and employment status are key mediating 
factors in worker autonomy and control (Cohen: 2010:75-76).  In the UK state provision of homecare 
evolved from a ‘home helps’ service established during the Second World War and provided by 
women on an informal and partly-paid basis (Dexter and Harbert, 1983).  From the 1970s onwards 
homecare work was gradually established as formal employment with regular fixed hours, written 
contracts, employment security, access to an occupational pension and latterly, to equal pay.  Since 
the demand for homecare peaks at certain times in the day (mornings, lunchtimes, evenings and 
bed-times) Herbert and Dexter (1983) observed that having to recognise homecare workers’ time in 
full, and having to acknowledge fixed and regular hours of work  ran a risk of ‘the home help being 
paid for doing nothing’ introducing costs for homecare services. The transfer of homecare workers 
from direct employment by the local authority to the private sector involved the introduction of 
ZHCs and eradication of so-called paid ‘down-time’ between homecare visits. The gendered history 
of homecare provides the context for the restoration of unpaid work. 
What has been described as ‘the homogenisation of working time’, extends the real subsumption of 
labour and capital’s permeation into free time, with labour increasingly available to capital (Bell and 
Tuckman 2002). There is a blurring of the line between time expended in ‘labour’ (where labour is 
sold as a commodity), and ‘free time’ outside of that contract and the encroachment of 
commodified time into free time (referred to as ‘partial commodification’) (Tuckman 2005). 
Tuckman identifies increased decommodification (distinct from Esping-Anderson’s conceptualisation 
of the role of the welfare state in valorising labour (1999)) of ‘labour necessary for the immediate 
preparation for productive activity’ and the disruption of continuous commodified time.  This 
conceptualisation of decommodification has been previously applied in research on changes in the 
labour process in US healthcare: in the context of cost cutting, paid female waged work was replaced 
or reshaped by female unpaid domestic labour (Glazer, 1998). Tuckman’s position recalls Supiot’s 
(2001) argument that there is a dialectical relationship between paid and unpaid labour in which 
boundaries between free and working time are regarded as permeable.  This leads to uncertainty 
over the time that employees are ‘available’ to the employer and, according to Supiot (2001), this is 
time that is neither clearly working time nor clearly free time. In homecare, ZHCs mean there is lack 
of clarity as to which parts of the day are paid, despite continuous availability to the employer. As 
Glazer demonstrated, when set in the specific context of marketised homecare the shifting 




A three year study of the recruitment and retention of the wider social care workforce in public and 
private sectors confirms the potential for EM in homecare to reduce pay by ‘restricting paid work 
time, to time actually spent in people’s houses’ (Rubery et al. 2011:345). Whilst ZHCs may blur the 
relationship between paid and unpaid labour time, the introduction of EM clearly delineates the 
time spent by care workers in the service user’s home. EM may be a monitoring tool to locate 
workers in the interests of service-users, yet where pay is restricted to contact time only it becomes 
a mechanism to demarcate paid and unpaid working time and normalises unpaid working time. In 
legal terms it has been argued that the bifurcation of working time into periods characterised as 
‘active’ and ‘inactive’, hinging upon availability to the employer, allows ‘the carving out of “inactive” 
periods from the parameters of regulated work across labour markets as a whole’ (McCann and 
Murray 2014:342). Whilst ZHCs and EM can operate in a mutually exclusive manner, in the context 
of budget cuts they can become interdependent.   
The legacy of gendered domestic labour has underpinned the notion of discretionary (‘extra’ care 
given outside paid working hours at the discretion of workers) labour in care work and the blurring 
of the boundaries between informal and formal work (Aronson and Neysmith, 1996). It has been 
suggested that a gendered and ethically driven propensity to care may inhibit the articulation of 
interest as workers (Folbre, 2001) with care workers individually compensating for cuts to services or 
the increasing depersonalisation of care (Aronson and Neysmith, 1996) through discretionary effort 
or unpaid labour time.   
A workplace survey suggested that EM led to the intensification of homecare workers’ labour, but 
that discretionary effort was not reduced (Brown and Korzcynski 2010). However, the research 
cohort concerned homecare workers directly employed by the local authority the survey did not 
examine EM in the context of marketised cost competition and private provision.  Technology 
shapes the labour process, including social relationships (Prichard et al, 2014; Ball, 2010) and as the 
case studies below show, the excision of ‘unproductive’ labour facilitated by EM squeezes the 
relational aspects of care that are embedded within commodified relationships (Ungerson, 1999). 
Where EM makes it absolutely clear that their time is unpaid, as Folbre warns, over time the 
‘exploitation of worker empathy may undermine’ the discretionary effort upon which homecare has 
been dependent (2012:612). 
Methods  
As the introductory quote indicates, while workers’ subjective experience of technology is crucial 
(Hayes and Moore, 2016), the focus of this article is on the rationale for EM from the perspective of 
the technology supplier and technology design (Collin-Jacques and Smith, 2005); and its legitimation 
by local authority commissioners, managers and their homecare providers. It highlights the temporal 
commissioning of care that EM facilitates in one of the case study authorities.   
The study, funded through a British Academy/Leverhulme grant, is based upon case studies of 
homecare commissioning in two neighbouring local authorities (Authority A and Authority B) in the 
South West of England and took place between 2014 and 2015.  The case study method facilitated a 
combination of data collection methods from a variety of sources (Dooley, 2002). The wider context 
for the case studies - the rationale for the implementation of EM systems - was provided by 
interviews with representatives of the technology supplier and textual analysis of their sales and 
publicity material, including published case studies of implementation.  
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The selection of case studies was largely pragmatic and driven by local accessibility. While the South 
West case studies cannot claim to be representative of all local authority commissioning of care, the 
comparison of two local authorities within a similar labour market (dealing with the same national 
budgetary pressures) is instructive in capturing the scope for variation in the adoption and 
application of tendering requirements including EM. Triangulation was achieved through analysis of 
EM in the homecare strategies of nine organisations that had adopted UNISON’s ECC, including 
seven local authorities (based upon interviews with 18 local authority commissioning or service 
managers, 9 providers, 11 care workers and 13 UNISON representatives). Their adoption of the ECC 
suggests the capacity for political agency in a constrained economic context. The ECC research also 
reveals that the maximum rates providers could charge for care in the two case study authorities 
detailed below were towards the lower end of the spectrum.  In addition the role of EM in various 
local authorities was captured through public documentation of the commissioning process available 
on their websites. This was supplemented by previous work carried out by both researchers, which 
included participation in five case studies of homecare for the Low Pay Commission in the period 
prior to this research (Bessa et al., 2013) and a three year research fellowship focused on developing 
a socio-legal ethnographic account of working in homecare explored through the lens of labour law 
(Hayes, 2017).  
Data on commissioning in the two South West authorities was drawn from supporting 
documentation including commissioning strategies, consultations and tender documents. This was 
complemented by interviews with two representatives of the supplier of electronic monitoring 
software/systems; seven in-depth interviews with six local authority officers involved in the 
commissioning of homecare services and service management; and five interviews with senior 
managers or owners of three homecare providers.  Interviews focussed on the commissioning 
process and the use and implementation of EM. Local authority officers provided contacts with 
homecare providers in the two authorities. Senior managers or owners of three homecare providers 
were interviewed, one from a large national company in Authority B and two from smaller local 
companies, one in Authority A and one that delivered across both authorities. While only three 
interviews took place with providers, these participants were solely responsible for tendering at the 
local level and had intimate knowledge of the process. Since re-commissioning in one authority was 
prolonged, the research took on a longitudinal perspective with re-interviews with commissioners 
and providers to capture the tendering process and its outcomes. All interviews were face-to-face, 
based upon informed consent and recorded and transcribed: they lasted approximately 90 minutes.  
Written and spoken texts were subjected to critical discourse analysis (Roper et al. 2010), starting 
with micro-level textual analysis to identify the stated rationales behind the development, 
introduction, implementation and marketing of EM. This captured dissonance between theory and 
practice, particularly where financial savings was introduced in both supplier publicity material and 
local authority officer interviews. Macro-analysis illuminated the way the political economy of care 
drove wider social-political practices that shaped the texts, but were also influenced by them, 
thereby providing organisational, social and political contextualisation (Roper et al. 2010).   
Homecare commissioning and Zero Hours Contracts – the contractual basis for EM? 
ZHCs were embedded in homecare in both authorities and this was financially driven with the 
allocation of care packages largely on the basis of cost. In Authority B the re-commissioning process 
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had promoted an hourly Living Wage and the option of fixed hour contracts to move away from 
ZHCs; however the maximum charge rate had been set at a rate which could apparently 
accommodate neither, as the local manager for one national provider commented: 
The most frightening thing about the whole process is the charge rate and the maximum 
they’ve set it at is £14.20, which is a cut for us. We’re trying to pay our homecare workers a 
living wage, we’re trying to pay appropriate mileage, travel time and on the margins that 
you’ve got on the charge rate that the local authority are setting you can’t do all of that - it is 
impossible.’  
In fact, this provider lost out in the recommissioning process, reporting that one of the four 
successful providers had tendered at £12.20 an hour – a rate which the Director of the company 
stated was ‘unviable’. In general, commissioning procedures set maximum charges for homecare 
with a single rate for all categories of care and service-user groups on a 24 hour, seven days per 
week basis. There is a disincentive for the provider to pay any enhancements for weekend and 
evening rates as well as payment of travel time. One provider who contracted with both authorities 
pointed to the contracting-out of local authority jobs as key to eliminating so-called ‘down time’ 
from labour costs since privatisation signalled the end of the secure employment previously 
available to local authority homecare workers:  
If we employed care staff on a permanent contract, the rates would be higher because it will 
push up the costs. We pay statutory sick pay, they get holiday pay now, but there’s going to 
be down time - that was the biggest problem that the local authorities had when they 
provided in-house care. Well the local authorities employed homecare assistants on fixed 
contracts, fixed hours, so they would work from 8am till 4pm.  They would be busy from 
8am till 12pm or 2pm and then the rest of the day there was nothing else to do, but they 
were being paid for that time. The majority of our people are on Zero Hours Contracts – 
obviously there’s no down time’. 
ZHCs, in the context of local authority commissioning, have marked a move away from fixed hours 
contracts based upon consolidated paid working time, where all aspects of the working day and 
night (travel and time between visits, supervision, staff meetings, unsocial hours, management and 
the general sharing of practice)  were recognised and rewarded. ZHCs facilitate the removal of what 
was hitherto paid working time during periods of ‘low demand’ from homecare workers’ schedules 
and this is the context for the introduction of EM. 
Electronic Monitoring – rationale and reality 
Tender documents increasingly stipulate that providers use specified EM systems. Authority A had 
required Framework providers to adopt EM since 2009, but in 2014 were required to use the 
Council’s centralised system with the local authority contributing to the costs of implementation. 
Authority B had previously only expected larger providers to use EM, but it was now a requirement 
to use the same Council system as Authority A under the re-commissioning process, with the 
introduction of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) based, for example, on the proportion of late visits 
measured through EM. Care work is thus ‘reconstituted in the abstract’ through performance 
metrics (Zureik, 2003:39). When a care worker arrives at a service users’ home they dial their unique 
number to the EM supplier’s call processing centre. The system matches the service user’s telephone 
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number to the database of service users, logging the time the call was made and matching this to 
the roster/schedule of care – the care worker repeats the procedure when leaving to log the length 
of the visit. Where the local authority specifies its supplier it owns the Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR) to information on the EM system; the Council’s system shows instantly if a visit has been 
missed or if the homecare worker is late or leaves early and system alerts allow council officers to 
deal with these immediately. Observation of the system in council offices testifies to the irony that 
whilst local authorities no longer directly employ care workers, a computer screen shows in real time 
whether a named worker employed by a provider has entered, is inside or has left a service users’ 
home and in an adjacent column simultaneously calculates the cost of the visit to the Council.  
While ‘the rhetoric of safety’ may support the use of surveillance technologies, it is not their only 
objective and there is a tension in the employment relationship between workplace surveillance as 
coercive and protective/performance-enhancing (Rosenblat et al. 2014).  The case studies show that 
three narratives legitimised the use of EM: worker and provider compliance; safeguarding for service 
users and care workers; and financial savings. Commissioning documentation and interviews with 
local authority officers generally embraced all three narratives and moved between them. The 
leading supplier of EM claimed in its publicity materials that systems were designed to improve 
efficiency and quality assurance in homecare safeguarding both service users and staff. Authority A 
stated that it had introduced EM for various reasons including to promote safety for lone workers 
and service users, to improve the quality and visibility of the service, to reduce the pressure on the 
service user to sign timesheets evidencing care received and to ensure invoices from providers were 
linked to actual hours of care commissioned and delivered.  Analysis of other local authority web-
sites revealed that explanations for the use of EM included recognition of ‘national imperatives to 
rationalize the way domiciliary care is commissioned’ (Bolton Council, 2009:2); improved safety for 
care workers and service users (Wrexham Council, 2010-15); ability to ‘make efficient and accurate 
payments to care providers’ (Leicester Equality Impact Assessment, Domiciliary Care Contracts 2011-
2015:8) and the reduction in service-user complaints about poor time-keeping (London Borough of 
Bromley, 2010).   
Crucially supplier marketing material promises savings because local authorities pay only for the 
costs of the actual care delivered. For local authorities the system offers a three-way analysis of 
commissioned (purchased) time versus planned (scheduled) time versus actual (delivered) time.  This 
was explained as follows by a Marketing Manager for the system: 
‘What’s commissioned compared with what’s planned, compared with what’s actually 
delivered, is totally different.  So quite often the planned care package, once it goes out to 
an external provider, will be somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent different from what 
was commissioned largely based on the ability of the care provider to actually deliver for 
that service user.  And that’s understood within the market to be a key dynamic.  For many 
councils, it was about making sure that they were only paying for the care that was delivered 
once they’d outsourced the bulk of their homecare’. 
In a context where demand for care fluctuates significantly on a weekly basis, providers are paid for 
time spent in ‘actual care delivered’ and are penalised if visits exceed planned or commissioned time 
(unless they can demonstrate exceptional circumstances). The supplier had worked with 65 local 
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authorities and reported significant financial benefits. One county council claimed savings of £1 
million in the first year following adoption of EM.  
In Authority A, EM allowed the Council to reduce administration with the automation of timesheets 
and to save time on producing invoices, which are generated directly from the EM system and 
‘linked efficiently to actual hours of care commissioned’ (case study published by supplier, 2009). It 
was reported that since the authority had begun paying for only the care delivered it had made ten 
per cent savings in its Adult Social Care purchasing budget. Invoices are paid only if they are 
submitted via the system (in exceptions the provider is charged by the Council for processing 
invoices) and where the total visit time is within the parameters defined by the Council. Where visits 
are in excess of a ten per cent tolerance period, there is an investigation and payment will not be 
authorised if it is considered that variation is not justified. Payments are not made when visits have 
been logged incorrectly.  
A commissioning officer with responsibility for quality from Authority B legitimated EM in terms of 
compliance and safeguarding staff rather than cost, although she was more sceptical about 
protecting the quality of care: 
I think at the beginning, some of the care workers found it a bit of a faff, felt it was a bit big 
brother-ish, which you can understand, also you can understand some of them might have 
felt that it was there because of a lack of trust.  It’s better for the staff because of the fact 
that they can prove they’ve been there.  They can prove they arrived, and when they left.  
They can’t prove what they did in between, but at least they can prove something. I don’t 
think it’s a way of saving money, that’s my feeling, but I work on the quality assurance side.  
The primary function is to make sure that people are turning up and reassurance that people 
are going to turn up on time and that something happens if they don’t.  
However, in common with Local Authority A, the Commissioning Manager also reported financial 
savings, including in circumstances where a service user decided they did not want a scheduled visit 
at the point when the care worker turned up: 
We’ve had a cost saving since we’ve introduced [EM].  What we were doing was we were 
paying providers on what we commissioned, so if we commissioned ‘x’ number of hours, 
they would then be paid for ‘x’ number of hours, what we now do is we pay providers on 
what we call actuals, so the actual time they’ve spent with the service user,because we were 
paying too much, because often what was provided wasn’t what was commissioned - 
perhaps the service user’s needs changed or often it can be the case that they would say to 
the provider ‘I don’t want you today because my daughter’s here or whatever’ - there’s a 
legitimate reason for turning the provider away.  
In such circumstances the authority would not pay the provider and it is likely that the homecare 
worker would not be paid. The requirement for providers to use EM prevents them from overriding 
the system by manually entering data from their offices. This was tolerated under the previous 
voluntary system on the basis that care workers might forget to log-in or log-out or service users 
would not allow them to use their phones or  service user’s phones may be busy. In Local Authority B 
EM was anticipated to reduce ‘illegitimate’ manual entries since the Council could monitor centrally 
on a real-time basis. While there was still some tolerance of the failure to log in and out the 
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dominant perception of council managers was that both providers and care workers had been able 
to manipulate the system to cover up for missed or shortened visits. One provider working across 
both authorities commented 
I think people forget to do it, and in some cases genuinely.  I think other cases they’re trying 
to work the system. If you don’t log out and you go on to your next call you can log in 
somewhere else [although] you can’t possibly be in the same place at the same time.  So 
you’ve got a 30 minute call, you might have only stayed 20 minutes but you haven't logged 
out so you’re at the next clients.  Whereas if they’d have stayed their full 30 minutes, - you 
can’t be at Gladys’s at twenty past seven when you only got to Bert’s at 7, and it’s a 30 
minute call.  So they’re shortcutting the calls or – so it can be worked.  It can be abused shall 
we say, not worked, and obviously we have to as providers clamp down on that and try and 
address those things.  
Interviews with homecare workers suggested that genuinely forgetting to log-in or out was a common 
occurrence and under EM could result in neither the worker nor the homecare provider being paid for 
the visit. Time and tracking technologies can be used to constrain employee attempts to ‘steal’ time 
from employers (Ehrenreich, 2001) and in the case of homecare commissioning this extends to 
providers.  EM can ensure that visits are not cut short (‘clipping’) because of the pressures of ‘call 
cramming’ (back-to-back visits with insufficient time between them for the care worker to reach her 
next visit on time), where care workers may be trying to catch up on visits. Call Cramming provides an 
incentive for workers to cut calls short in order to minimise unpaid time between visits and this is 
further encouraged where travel time is insufficient or not paid; ‘clipping’ may allow care workers to 
claw back some paid working time. EM prevents this since it delineates and polices paid and unpaid 
time. For homecare workers, real-time surveillance means any space for the contestation of the 
boundary between paid and unpaid labour is reduced.   
Minute by Minute commissioning 
Local Authority A commissioned on contact time, but careworkers were paid in ‘bands’, so initially 
for a minimum of 30 minutes and then to the nearest 15 minutes thereafter, providing some 
flexibility. However, in Authority B re-commissioning meant providers would only be able to charge 
for contact time on a minute by minute basis. The requirement to adopt EM involved a move from a 
banding system, where workers would be paid to the nearest 15 minutes, to being paid by the 
minute, as a provider anticipated: 
If they do minute by minute billing, and that person leaves early, they will only get paid their 
20 minutes, whereas at the moment, if the girls stay over 23 minutes they get paid for a 30 
minute call. 
Here all directly ‘unproductive’ time is squeezed out of the system. For commissioners this means 
care workers do not ‘hang around’ (apparently unproductive) to the cut-off point of a visit as they 
may do under the banding system – minute-by-minute commissioning removes the incentive to 
work to the cut-off point since workers know they are not paid to ‘hang around’. It potentially means 
that more calls can be scheduled, so pressure to move on to the next service-user is maintained, but 
paid working time is minimised whilst maximising the use of unpaid time between visits. This is the 
intensification of care labour. 
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Provider overheads and any profit margins have to be recouped from the difference between the 
hourly charge rate as delivered and the hourly wage. Any costs associated with time for training, 
management, supervision or travel have to be paid by providers out of actual contact time. One 
provider working across both authorities reported that the organisation could not pay staff for 
training, although it paid for their travel to training events and provided lunch as compensation. A 
Commissioning Officer in Authority B recognised that care workers were trained on their days off 
and this was unpaid. For a national provider EM in the context of the Council’s maximum charge 
rates squeezed overheads and potential profit: 
Well they’re saving, if the carers are going in and it’s a 30 minute call and they go in for 20 
minutes, they only get paid for the 20 minutes.  So in a week if that happened, it all adds up 
doesn’t it and if you’re doing a lot of calls it’s going to add up somewhere along the line isn’t 
it?  When you think what has got to come out of that hourly charge rate it’s frightening – we 
put in the cost of the manager, the cost of the coordinator or two coordinators, the cost of 
senior carers, the cost of an office, the cost of the organisation’s umbrella - HR all of that – 
then there’s the IT, the EM system, the expenditure on that – that’s all got to come out of 
the £14.20. [The] hourly pay rate – the lowest rate is £7.45, national insurance, pensions –
you try and work out the maths because I can’t! The person from the bid team [in the 
organisation] that was doing it came back to me and said ‘are you having a laugh?’ and I said 
‘no I’m not that is the highest we can bid at’, she said ‘you just can’t do it’. 
This observation attests to the closing of the porosity of the working day, which had hitherto been 
used to compensate for unpaid elements. Homecare workers interviewed regarded their ‘working 
time’ as the length of time for which they wore their uniform.  Applying this measure, only about 
half of their working time would qualify for pay under EM on a typical day with workers penalised for 
running late, whether through call cramming, the unexpected demands of service users or travel 
difficulties. Even a well-organised work schedule could involve an hour and a half of unpaid ‘hold 
ups’ each day and one worker appreciated that, ‘over a week, that’s nearly a whole day’s pay that 
you are working for nothing’. Another reported committing herself to working a 15 hour day and 
receiving between 5-8 hours pay. Perversely, a greater intensity of work could result in less pay 
where rotas were crammed with more calls than could be properly serviced since each separate visit 
introduced new sources of potential unpaid time. The colleague of one care worker interviewed had 
calculated that the introduction of EM had resulted in a wage drop of £50 a week.  
In the case studies of authorities that had adopted UNISON’s ECC only one of the seven authorities 
paid providers on contact time to the minute. Significantly, one of this authority’s providers reported 
that it absorbed the difference between contact and scheduled time in order to protect care worker’s 
pay and avoid staff turnover; she suggested that providers often accommodate such costs. The other 
authorities rejected minute by minute commissioning as incompatible with ethical care. Minute by 
minute commissioning represents a further step change in homecare since it goes beyond pay based 
upon time bands, in closing any temporal gaps in which homecare workers can claw back unpaid 
working time and excising all apparently ‘unproductive’ labour time for the purposes of pay.  
The quality of work and discretionary labour 
Homecare workers clearly understood EM as a system which set limitations on their pay, anchoring 
paid time within service users’ homes. It was also perceived as a disem99bodied power that 
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undermined their discretion and capacity to reconstruct their working time, possibly to demonstrate 
or manufacture compliance (Levy, 2015). EM is used to ensure that the worker has to stay until the 
end of the service-users’ allotted time in order to be paid even if when judged that she is not 
required. By the same token, the availability of paid working time might not correspond with the 
time needed to fulfil tasks specified in the care plan. In the context of the unpredictable nature of 
homecare work where service-users are vulnerable, homecare workers may choose to stay beyond 
scheduled time, particularly in an emergency.   As one explained, ‘you can’t just walk out of the door 
and leave and say ‘well, my time is up now, I’ve got to go!’, but staying longer than scheduled meant 
spending time without pay. Homecare workers experience a dissonance between their desire to 
provide holistic care and their need to work on the basis of task-orientated time rationing (Ungerson 
1993: 201).  Many homecare workers concluded that EM affected the quality of care they were able 
to provide.  A Service Manager in Local Authority A conceded that it does not necessarily provide 
quality assurance:  
I think it was introduced supposedly for quality purposes, although my personal opinion is 
that it doesn’t monitor quality, it’s finance driven actually. Before we would pay for what 
we’d commissioned, so now we pay for the actual; so if they were there for 29 minutes we 
pay for 29 minutes. All it does is tells you that somebody turned up, it doesn’t tell you what 
they did.  It doesn’t talk about the attitude to the way that they provided care, it just tells 
you that they were in the house for half an hour; they could have been sat there. 
The qualified confidence which local authority officers and providers had in EM does not suggest the 
levels of trust and discretion that Prichard, et al. (2014) identified as key to mediating the 
introduction of technological systems that imply high levels of managerial control. In homecare the 
direct relationship between service delivery, contractors’ invoices and workers’ pay, places extreme 
pressure on discretionary labour, something the care system has historically depended upon. 
Recognition that relational aspects of care are increasingly unpaid is captured in a provider’s 
comment: 
We have had cases where someone has stayed to have a chat with a service-user – well 
Local Authority B aren’t going to pay us for the homecare worker to stay and have a chat 
with them. We tell the worker ‘that’s your time.  Log out of your time and then stay and 
have a chat if you like but you need to go on to your other clients’.  
In a slightly contradictory remark demonstrating the tension between service quality and cost, this 
provider mentioned that EM had been abandoned at a neighbouring Council, where she had 
previously delivered services: 
The carers don’t like EM and we had a huge resistance when it was first introduced.  And in 
fact they introduced the electronic monitoring and what happened was it affected the 
quality, the relationship between the carer and the client.  It was clock watching – and you 
hear the ‘we need to come on, get a move on’ sort of thing and ‘I’ve got to get to the next 
person’. Well we don’t have a choice in it, we won’t have any work if we don’t comply - 
[Local Authority B] felt that they were paying more, they could pay less. It was financial. 
EM was seen to further reduce paid care-giving to an attempt to fulfil of a series of tasks within a 
pre-determined time period, increasingly focussed upon operation of the telephone system.  
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As Glucksman (1995; 2005) explains, care work sits on a conceptual fault-line dividing social 
understanding of the world of paid work, from that of ‘economic inactivity’ associated with the 
private, domestic realm of home and family. Previous studies have identified the difficulties of 
separating formal and informal labour in care work (Bolton and Wibberley, 2014) and of thus 
distinguishing between paid and unpaid work. Where cost-cutting drives the depersonalisation of 
the labour process and the formal description of care work does not correspond to the worker’s 
reality (Aronson and Neysmith, 1996) discretionary or unpaid care work has been seen as resistance 
(Glazer, 1993; Baines, 2004; Hochschild, 2009). One homecare worker recounted that she would 
return to her service users later in the day to finish duties in her own time which she had been 
unable to complete within the confines of electronically monitored time. However, the voluntary 
nature of discretionary labour has been questioned (Aronson and Neysmith, 1996) and other 
interviewees were either unwilling or unable to engage in such unpaid activity. In Bolton and 
Wibberley’s (2014) terms, while ZHCs might blur formal and informal labour, EM explicitly 
demarcates it echoing the introduction of dichotomies between productive and unproductive and 
consequently paid and unpaid time. EM would appear to constrain the capacity for discretionary 
labour from care work. Rather than recognising and paying for the relational aspects of care often 
delivered through the discretionary labour of women, these elements of the labour process have 
become totally devalued alongside women’s pay. 
Conclusions  
According to the EM supplier and the local authorities that have adopted it the introduction of EM in 
homecare delivery is motivated by a desire to safeguard service users, to ensure the physical safety 
of care workers and, by policing compliance, to improve the quality of care.  The research presented 
here suggests that EM goes beyond the recording of working time (Cockburn and Ormerod, 1993). In 
the context of austerity and cuts in local authority budgets the key drivers are financial, supporting 
Zureik’s conclusion that the surveillance of work cannot be severed from the surrounding political 
and economic environment (2003). In homecare, labour intensification is delivered through the 
commissioning process, which facilitates episodic working time based on contact time and 
underpinned by ZHCs. Here boundaries between paid and unpaid work are blurred because it is 
unclear whether travel time and the ‘down’ time between visits represent working time for the 
purposes of pay. While hourly rates for homecare workers may be formally at or above the level of 
what was then the National Minimum Wage (and in some cases the Living Wage) an increasing 
proportion of working time is unpaid. This is not just a problem in homecare.  A Guardian 
investigation into Sports Direct, where 80 per cent of warehouse workers were on ZHCs, found that 
effectively they were paid below the NMW because of the non-payment of time for on-site security 
searches5.  Using Marx’s metaphor of actors on stage waiting in the wings, Tuckman’s (2005) analysis 
points to the increased availability of labour to capital that ZHCs entail. 
It is possible for local authorities to use EM to simply ensure that homecare workers are in service 
users’ homes as commissioned; to protect them from allegations of missed and late visits; and to 
automate and simplify invoicing.  Yet there is little evidence that EM has the potential to empower 
workers (Zureik, 2003). Rather in some authorities EM, in contrast to ZHCs, enforces a spatial and 





temporal delineation which is then used to formalise and demarcate paid and unpaid work, while 
simultaneously demanding unbounded availability from the worker. Where EM is applied in this way 
ZHCs provide the necessary contractual basis. In one configuration EM may prevent homecare 
workers from leaving before the end of commissioned time so that they cannot claw back unpaid 
travel time. In another, minute-by-minute commissioning squeezes out ‘unproductive’ labour 
(‘hanging around’) and by costing care on the basis of time in the service-users’ home places huge 
pressures on payment for travel time as well as paid training and supervision. It further shifts the 
ratio between paid and unpaid working time. This situation is driven by local authority charge rates 
and minute-by-minute commissioning would appear to be incompatible with adoption of UNISON’s 
Ethical Care Charter, which demands a charge rate nearer to the full costs of labour as well as an end 
to ZHCs. 
In combination, ZHC and EM strip so-called ‘unproductive’ labour from care work. Confounding 
Himmelweit (2005), this assessment suggests the market has found a way to increase productivity in 
care.  Nevertheless, this involves an attack on both the relational aspects and quality of care, 
reducing it to a series of tasks in the Taylorist fashion.  Paradoxically, the introduction of EM 
removes the discretionary labour that gendered care has historically relied upon, yet does so in a 
manner that degrades, rather than valorises, care work.   
As Glazer (1998) argued, the decommodification of women’s care work is in the interests of capital. 
The removal of state support for welfare and social care in the context of neoliberal capitalism has 
profound effects upon women’s paid care labour and the value of care. In this context, the excision 
of paid labour from care work is highly gendered. The process may serve, from the perspective of 
the state and its withdrawal from social provision, to legitimate the partial restoration of unpaid 
work in homecare; a regressive step away from the recognition of care as paid work with collective 
employment rights. The reliance of care for the elderly upon the unpaid labour of largely women 





Adams, Z. and S. Deakin (2014) Re-regulating zero hours contracts (London: Institute of Employment 
Rights).  
Aronson, J. and Neysmith, S. (1996) "You're not just in there to do the work": Depersonalizing 
policies and the exploitation of home care workers' labor’, Gender and Society, 10, 1, 59-77.  
Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (2016) ADASS Budget Survey 2016 Report 
(London:ADASS). 
Baines, D. (2004) ‘Caring for nothing; work organisation and unwaged labour in social services’, 
Work, Employment and Society 18, 2, 267-295. 
Ball, K. (2010) ‘Workplace surveillance: an overview’, Labor History 51, 1, 87-106. 
15 
 
Bell, E. and A. Tuckman (2002) ‘Hanging on the Telephone: Temporal Flexibility and the Accessible 
Worker’ in Whipp, R., B. Adam and I. Sabelis (eds), Making Time: Time and Management in Modern 
Organization, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 115-25.  
Bergvall-Kåreborn, B. and D. Howcroft (2014) ‘Amazon Mechanical Turk and the commodification of 
Labour’, New Technology, Work and Employment 29,3, 213–223. 
Bessa I., C. Forde, S. Moore, and M. Stuart (2013) The National Minimum Wage, earnings and hours 
in the domiciliary care sector, (London: Low Pay Commission). 
Bolton Council (2008) ‘Commissioning Policy and Payment Structure for Domiciliary Care’, Report to 
Executive Member for Health and Adult Social Care: 1-15. 
Bolton, S.C. and G. Wibberley (2014) ‘Domiciliary Care: The Formal and Informal Labour Process’, 
Sociology 48, 4, 682-697. 
Brown, K. and M. Korczynski, (2010) ‘When Caring and Surveillance Technology Meet: Organizational 
Commitment and Discretionary Effort in Home Care Work’, Work and Occupations 37, 3,404-32. 
Cockburn, C. and Ormerod, S. (1993) Gender and Technology in the Making London: Sage. 
Cohen, R. L. (2010) ‘Rethinking Mobile Work: boundaries of space, time and social relations in the 
working lives of mobile hair stylists’, Work, Employment and Society 24, 1, 65-84. 
Collin-Jacques, C. and C. Smith (2005) ‘Nursing on the line: experiences from England and Quebec 
(Canada)’, Human Relations 58, 1, 5-32 
Dexter, M. and W. Herbert (1983) The Home Help Service (London: Tavistock). 
Dominelli, L. and A. Hoogvelt. (1996) ‘Globalization and the Technocratization of Social Work’, 
Critical Social Policy 16, 2, 45–62. 
Ehrenreich, B. (2001) Nickel and Dime: On (not) getting by in America 29, New York, NY: 
Metropolitan Books.  
Ellis, V. and P. Taylor (2006) 'You don't know what you've got till it's gone': re-contextualising the 
origins, development and impact of the call centre’, New Technology Work and Employment 21, 2, 
107-122.  
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) Social foundations of postindustrial economies (Oxford, OUP). 
Folbre, N. (2012) ‘Should Women Care Less? Intrinsic Motivation and Gender Inequality’, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 50, 4, 597-619. 
Folbre, N. (2001) The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values (New York: New Press). 
Fraser, N. (2011) ‘The Wages of Care: Reproductive Labour as Fictitious Commodity’ in Women's 
Rights in the 21st Century Cambridge University, 9th March 2011. 
Glazer, N. ( 1998) ‘Overlooked, Overworked: Women’s Unpaid and Paid Work in the Health Services 
“Cost Crisis!’  International Journal of Health Services, 18, 1, 119- 137. 
16 
 
Glucksmann, M.A. (2004) ‘Call Configurations: Varieties of Call Centre and Divisions of Labour’, 
Work, Employment and Society 18, 4, 795–811. 
Green, F. (2001), ‘It’s Been a Hard Day’s Night: The Concentration and Intensification of Work in Late 
Twentieth-Century Britain’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 39, 1, 53–80. 
Hayes, L.J.B (2017) Stories of care: A labour of law.  Gender and class at work (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Hayes, L.J.B. and Moore, S. (2016) ‘Care in a Time of Austerity’: The Electronic Monitoring of 
Homecare Workers’ Time’ Gender, Work and Organisation doi:10.1111/gwao.12164 
Himmelweit, S. (2005) ‘Can we Afford (not) to Care: Prospects and Policy’ Gender Institute New 
Working Paper 15 July 2005. 
Hochschild, A. (2009) Invited commentary: ‘Can Emotional Labour be fun?’ International Journal of 
Work Organisation and Emotion 3, 2, 112-119. 
Howcroft, D. and P. Taylor (2014) ‘”Plus ca change, plus la meme chose?”—researching and 
theorising the “new” new technologies’, New Technology, Work and Employment 29, 1, 1–8. 
Jacobs, A. and I. Padavic (2015) ‘Hours, Scheduling and Flexibility for Women in the US Low-Wage 
Labour Force’, Gender Work and Organisation 22,1,67-86. 
Levy, K. (2015) ‘The Contexts of Control: Information, Power and Truck Driving Work’ The 
Information Society 31,2:160-174. 
London Borough of Bromley (2010) ‘Quality Monitoring of Domiciliary Care Services’, in Report No. 
ACS10024, 14th April. 
Marx, K. (1976) Capital, Volume 1 (London: Penguin). 
Mavroudeas, S. and A. Ioannides (2011) ‘Duration, Intensity and Productivity of Labour and the 
Distinction between Absolute and Relative Surplus-value’, Review of Political Economy 23, 3,421-
437. 
McCann, D. and J. Murray (2014) ‘Promoting Formalisation through Labour Market Regulation: “A 
Framed Flexibility” Model for Domestic Work’, Industrial Law Journal 43, 3: 319-348. 
Prichard, J., J. Turnbull, S. Halford and C. Pope (2014) ‘Trusting Technology in Call Centres’, Work, 
Employment and Society 28, 5: 808-824.  
Roper J., Ganesh S., and Inkson, K. (2010) ‘Neoliberalism and knowledge interests in boundaryless 
careers discourse’ Work, Employment and Society, 24, 4: 661–679.  
Rosenblat, A., Kneese, T. Boyd, D. (2014) Workplace Surveillance Data and Society Working Paper, 
Data and Society Research Institute. 
Rubery, J., G. Hebson, D. Grimshaw, M. Carroll, S. Smith, M. Marchington and S. Ugarte (2011) The 
Recruitment and Retention of a Care Workforce for Older People (London: Department of Health). 
17 
 
Rubery, J., D. Grimshaw, G. Hebson and S. Ugarte (2015) ‘It’s all about time: time as contested 
terrain in the management and experience of domiciliary care work in England’ Human Resource 
Management Journal 54, 5,772. 
Skills for Care (2013) Size and Structure of the Adult Social Care Sector and Workforce in England, 
(Leeds: Skills for Care).  
Skills for Care (2016) The State of the Adult Social care Sector and Workforce in England - September 
2016 (Leeds:Skills for Care). 
Supiot, A. (2001) Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Tuckman, A. (2005) ‘Employment Struggles and the Commodification of Working Time: Marx and the 
Analysis of Working Time Flexibility’, Philosophy of Management 5, 2, 47-56. 
Ungerson, C. (1999) ‘Personal Assistants and Disabled People: An Examination of a Hybrid Form of 
Work and Care’, Work, Employment and Society 13, 4, 583-600.  
UKHCA (2015) A Minimum Price for Homecare (London: UKHCA). 
Zureik, E. (2003) ‘Theorizing Surveillance: The Case of the Workplace’ in Lyon, D. (Ed.) Surveillance as 
Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk & Digital Discrimination, Routledge, London and New York. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
